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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-New Mexico Changes the
Method of Allocating Future Pension Benefits Between
Divorcing Spouses: Ruggles v. Ruggles
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon divorce, courts in community property jurisdictions' must determine a community's interest in a pension, as well as when and how
the non-working spouse should receive his or her part of the pension.2
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed this issue in Ruggles v.
Ruggles3 and held that such pension benefits should be divided upon
divorce and that the non-working spouse should receive his or her share
of the assets upon divorce if the pension is mature.4 In doing so, the
court adopted a preference for the "lump sum" method of distribution
of pension benefits.5 While the Ruggles court expressed a strong preference
for full lump sum distribution of the pension assets at the time of divorce,
the court also recognized that the "lump sum" method will not work
in every case, and trial courts need flexibility when determining the method
of distributing assets. 6 Accordingly, the Ruggles court expressed a preference, not a mandate, for the "lump sum" method. 7 Because future
pension assets may be distributed using liquid assets from the community
estate,' the decision will have a tremendous impact on the division of
tangible property in many divorce cases. This Note examines the history
of the division of pensions upon divorce in New Mexico, relevant case
law from other states, the rationale of the Ruggles court in choosing the
"lump sum" method of distribution, and implications of the decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joseph and Nancy Ruggles decided to divorce. Joseph was an employee
of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, 9 and his wife was
1. There are nine community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. See generally W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 55-91 (2d. ed. 1971).
2. There are two primary methods currently used in community property jurisdictions to divide
future pension benefits: the "lump sum" method, which attempts to compensate the non-working
spouse for the working spouse's future pension benefits and the "pay as it comes" method, which
pays the non-working spouse his or her benefits only when the working spouse actually receives
his or her share. Id. at 114-200.
3. 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182 (1993).
4. Id. at 67, 860 P.2d at 197.
5. Id. at 67-68, 860 P.2d at 197-98. The "lump sum" method means that the pensioner will
"buy out" the non-working spouses's interest in the pension at the time of divorce. The court's
holding deals only with benefits which are both vested and matured. "Vested" benefits are those
which are owned by the employee, although he or she may not yet be eligible to receive them.
The benefits "mature" when the employee is eligible to receive them. See DAVIDSON ET AL., FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING 484-485 (5th ed. 1988).
6. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 67, 860 P.2d at 197.
7. Id. at 67-68, 860 P.2d at 197-98.
8. Id. at 66, 860 P.2d at 196.
9. Id. at 55. 860 P.2d at 185.
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employed by Albuquerque Public Schools. 10 Prior to trial, the couple
had signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) which outlined their
property rights." The MSA specified that Nancy's community property
share of her husband's retirement benefits was equal to 48% of the
pension annuity as of the date her husband was eligible to retire. 2 At
the time of the trial, Joseph's interest in his pension plan was fully vested
and matured. 3 It is unclear whether the MSA stated when Nancy was
to receive her share of the benefits. 4
The trial court ruled that Nancy should start receiving benefits when
Joseph was eligible to retire. 5 The court of appeals reversed that decision,
holding that Nancy should receive her benefits when Joseph began receiving his pension payments. 6 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals, stating that marital assets should
be divided upon divorce and paid in a lump sum if the pension is
mature. 7 The specific instructions from the Ruggles court to the trial
court on remand, however, were to enforce the MSA if the trial court
could determine the intent of the parties in drafting the contract. 8 If
the trial court could not determine the intent of the parties in drafting
the MSA, then the original trial court decision would be reinstated, which
would award Nancy Ruggles a pro-rated share of the pension on an
installment basis, as if Joseph had retired when he was eligible to retire. 9
The Ruggles court acknowledged that this is not the "lump sum" method,
but found that the MSA agreement dividing the tangible assets would
take precedence over any court-imposed distribution scheme. 20 The holding
states that this method of paying by installments is itself preferable to
the old "pay as it comes" method. The Ruggles court expressed a
preference for "lump sum" distribution of community assets at divorce,
but the final result in Ruggles will not be a "lump sum" distribution
and might be considered to be a third alternative. 2'

10. Id. at 56, 860 P.2d at 186.
11.Id. at 55-56, 860 P.2d at 185-86.
12. Id. at 55, 860 P.2d at 185.
13. Id.
14. Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that the MSA was unambiguous in granting
Nancy benefits, but each reached a different conclusion as to when the payout to Nancy should
begin. Id. at 56, 860 P.2d at 186.
15. Id.
16. Id. This decision exemplifies the "pay as it comes" method. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN,
supra notes 1-2.
17. Id. at 52, 860 P.2d at 182. This approach exemplifies the "lump sum" method.
18. Id. at 66, 860 P.2d at 196.
19. Id.
20. Id. Due to the existing MSA agreement in Ruggles, there would have been no assets for
the court to divide, making a lump sum award impractical.
21. See id. Mick v. Mick, a case consolidated with Ruggles, is less complicated and not really
of any importance for the purpose of analysis, because the court's rationale in Mick is similar to
that of Ruggles. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 57, 860 P.2d 182, 187 (1993). In a divorce action, Norman
Mick sued for immediate disbursement of his community share in his wife's federal retirement
benefits. Id. Both the trial court and the appeals court ruled against him. Id. The New Mexico
Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision and remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions to apply the "lump sum" method of distribution. Id. The only aspect of Mick
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III.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Introduction-Defining Methods of Distribution
The two primary methods of distributing community pension assets
22
upon divorce are the "lump sum" and the "pay as it comes" method.
Courts in jurisdictions that use the "lump sum" method try to derive
a present value for the future stream of retirement payments.2 3 In jurisdictions that utilize the "pay as it comes" method, the court reserves
jurisdiction over the case until the working spouse actually retires and
begins receiving benefits. 24 At that time, the benefits are divided on a
25
monthly, weekly, or yearly basis between the former spouses.
B.

Cases From Other Jurisdictions

1. The Majority View: The Lump Sum Method
A majority of community property jurisdictions have adopted the "lump27
sum" method 26 for dividing future pension benefits in divorce actions.
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue in Gillmore v. Gillmore, 28 a leading case involving a dispute over pension assets between
divorcing spouses. The California court ruled that one spouse should not
be able "to defeat the community interest of the other spouse" by

which differs from Ruggles in a legally significant way is the fact that Hazel Mick was a federal

employee. Because the pension in Mick was not a private pension, the retirement benefits are not
subject to the broad anti-assignment provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), or the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055 (1988). Ruggles, at 57 n.5, 860 P.2d at 187 n.5. ERISA governs private pension plans and
restricts the assignment of benefits to parties other than the beneficiary. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). The
REA provides states with a method of awarding divorcing spouses part interest in the pension plan
through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988). A QDRO was
necessary in Ruggles, but not in Mick. A detailed discussion of the federal laws governing pensions
is beyond the scope of this Note. However, there are a host of federal laws governing disbursements
of retirement benefits that may trump state laws under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
The New Mexico held in Luxton v. Luxton, 98 N.M. 276, 648 P.2d 315 (1982), that a husband's
U.S. Civil Service medical retirement benefits were community property since 5 U.S.C.S. § 83450)(1)
(Supp. IV 1980) provides for payments to persons other than the civil service employee under terms
of a divorce decree. Thus, although federal retirement plans are not subject to ERISA, they are
often subject to a host of other laws governing their disbursement. These regulations may take
precedence over state law.
22. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 60, 860 P.2d at 190. See also DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note I.

23. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 58-63, 860 P.2d at 188-93. Courts must estimate the size and number
of payments and then discount the cash flow by an appropriate discount rate. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra note 50 for further explanation of lump sum calculations.
27. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 60-61, 860 P.2d at 190-91. Idaho decides each case individually. See
Shill v. Shill, 599 P.2d 1004 (Idaho 1979). Washington tries to decide each case using the method
that will produce the most equitable result without a particular preference. See Edwards v. Edwards,
444 P.2d 703 (Wash. 1975).
28. 629 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1981).
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delaying his or her retirement. 29 The rationale of the California court is
the primary criticism of the "pay as it comes" method: that the working
spouse can control when the non-working spouse receives his or her share
of the pension plan by delaying retirement.30
The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the lump sum method in Gemma
v. Gemma.1' In Gemma, a police officer appealed a verdict awarding
32
his ex-wife a lump sum payment based on his unvested retirement benefits.
In upholding the trial court ruling, the Nevada court focused on the
amount of control one spouse has over the other's community property
assets, observing that the wife "may elect to receive pension benefits at
the time they become due and payable, this being defined in the divorce
decree as the time when [the husband] is first eligible to retire .... 1
Arizona also applied the lump sum method of distribution in Koelsh
v. Koelsh.14 The Koelsh court reversed a verdict from the appeals court
that divided pension assets between divorcing spouses on a "pay as it
comes" basis.35 The state supreme court criticized the appeals court
decision: "[iun ruling that the non-employee spouse's interest in the
retirement benefits cannot be satisfied until the employee spouse decides
to retire, the courts are awarding the latter unilateral control over the
property of the former." 3 6 The Koelsh court also found that it was unfair
for the non-working spouse to be forced to become an unwilling investor
in the pension assets." Arizona adopted a somewhat novel approach,
stating that the "pay as it comes" method was actually unfair to the
working spouse as well as the non-working spouse because under a
"straight line" method of calculation, the non-working spouse would
share any excess value the pension plan accrued due to the working
spouse's promotions and pay raises after the divorce.38
2. The Minority View: Pay As It Comes Method
Texas and Louisiana remain the only two community property states
to prefer the "pay as it comes" method. The Texas Supreme Court held
in Cearley v. Cearley"9 that a spouse's community property interest in
a pension plan must be valued and apportioned only when the retiring
spouse begins receiving the benefits. ° Cearley involved a dispute between

29. Id. at 4 (quoting In re Stenquist, 582 P.2d 96, 100 (Cal. 1978)). The logic of Gillmore was
central to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978),
and was a key argument in the case presented by Nancy Ruggles in Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 56, 860
P.2d at 186.
30. See Gillmore, 629 P.2d at 4.
31. 778 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1989).
32. Id. at 429-30.
33. Id.at 432.
34. 713 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. 1986).
35. Id. at 1244.
36. Id. at 1239.
37. Id. at 1240.
38. Id.
39. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
40. Id. at 666.
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an Air Force man and his wife over his military pension.", The Cearley
court ruled that such future benefits were only a contingency, and the
non-working spouse could receive her share of the pension only "if and
when" the working spouse received his share. 42 Similarly, the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled in Sims v. Sims43 that while a non-working wife's
ownership in her husband's pension plan should be recognized at the
time of divorce, the non-working spouse should receive no payment until
the benefits are paid to the working spouse or the working spouse dies."
In the wake of Ruggles, New Mexico is now in line with most of the
other community property jurisdictions. 4
B.

New Mexico Cases

1. Copeland: The Pre-Schweitzer Era
In LeClert v. LeClert,46 New Mexico first recognized that retirement
benefits earned during coverture are community property subject to division. 47 Nine years later, in 1978, the New Mexico Supreme Court
expressed a preference for immediate distributions of pension assets between divorcing spouses in Copeland v. Copeland." In Copeland, the
court established the "lump sum" method as the proper method of
dividing pensions in divorce actions. 49 This decision urged trial courts to
determine a present value for future pension benefits50 and then make

41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. at 662.
43. 358 So.2d 919 (La. 1981).
44. Id. at 923. The Sims court failed to address, however, whether a non-working spouse had
a remedy if the working spouse remained on the job for the sole purpose of depriving the nonworking spouse of community assets. Id.
45. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182.
46. 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
47. LeClert, 80 N.M. at 235, 453 P.2d at 755. The history of the LeClert decision is a lengthy
one involving the clash between the state's interest in a fair division of property and federal laws
governing the disbursement of military pensions. See Espinda v. Espinda, 96 N.M. 712, 634 P.2d
1264 (1981) (overruling LeClert). The New Mexico decision to overrule LeClert was based on a
U.S. Supreme Court case, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), which precludes states from
dividing military retirement pay. Congress then passed the Uniform Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988), which reversed McCarty, and New Mexico then reinstated
LeClert in Walentowski v. Walentowski, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657 (1983).
48. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
49. Id. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
50. The mathematics involved in calculating the present value of a future stream of cash payments
are complex. The formula for a discrete number of payments, or one in which the beneficiary's
benefits terminate at death is:
H

=

3

E! Rt (l+i)-

H, the upper case Greek letter pi, signifies present. When t=t,, the rate of the flow is R(t) dollars
per year. In a continuous cash flow, or in the case in which the beneficiary's benefits are inheritable,
the formula derives its answer from the definite integral:
H7 = J I R(t)e dt-"
However, an esoteric knowledge of mathematics is unnecessary. Present values can be rapidly
calculated using an inexpensive financial calculator, or a table of present value factors that can be
multiplied against the cash payment. For a complete discussion of net present value equations, see
ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 74-101 (2d ed. 1990).
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a lump sum payment to the non-working spouse from liquid community
assets equal to his or her share of the pension benefit." The Copeland
decision, however, also recognized that the "lump sum" method might
not work in every case, and that the "pay as it comes" method might
be the only practical one in cases where there are insufficient liquid assets
to make a lump sum or in cases where a lump value cannot be determined
2
with accuracy.1
The New Mexico Supreme Court continued to refine and modify
Copeland with subsequent cases giving the trial courts even more latitude
in determining how to divide pension benefits. For example, in Ridgeway
v. Ridgeway," the court recognized that it was impossible to determine
the future value of some profit sharing plans, and that lump sum payments
54
from such plans should be valued at their present undiscounted net worth.
The Copeland decision did not address the distinction between vested
and unvested pension plans, because the court was confronted with benefits
which were fully vested." Five years later, in Hertz v. Hertz,16 the court
ruled that even pension benefits which are not fully vested could be
valued and divided at the time of divorce providing the employee or
7
employer contributed to the plan during coverture.
2. Schweitzer: New Mexico Adopts the "Pay as it Comes" Method
The Schweitzer v. Burch" court rejected the Copeland doctrine and
expressed a rigid preference for the "pay as it comes" method. 9 Ironically,
the primary holding of Schweitzer does not address the issue of the
"lump sum" versus the "pay as it comes" methods, 60 but the court used
the opportunity in Schweitzer to address the issue of when a non-working
spouse is legally entitled to payments from the working spouse's pension
plan.6 1 The holding in Schweitzer stated, "[w]e now modify Copeland

51. See Copeland, 91 N.M. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
52. Id.
53. 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
54. Id. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751. The New Mexico Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue
of non-defined pension plans. These are essentially plans in which the employer invests the pension
money in securities but makes no predictions or promises as to what the benefits will be worth at
the time of retirement. See DAVIDSON, supra note 5. However, it would seem that the logic of
Ridgeway regarding profit sharing would also apply to the non-defined plans; therefore, the community
property value at the time of divorce would amount to the market value of the securities in the
employee's share of the non-defined plan. Few employers currently have non-defined pension plans,
because federal regulations like ERISA have made them costly to the employer. Id.
55. Copeland, 91 N.M. at 412, 575 P.2d at 102.
56. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
57. Id.
58. 103 N.M. 612, 711 P.2d 889 (1985).
59. Id. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892.
60. Id. at 612, 711 P.2d at 889. Schweitzer primarily addresses the issue of whether pension
benefits that were awarded by the courts to a non-working spouse on a "pay as it comes" basis
can be transferred through bequest. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that only payments
resulting from direct community contributions to the pension plan can be transferred to the relatives
of a deceased spouse. Id. Payments beyond those directly linked to the community's contributions
terminate at death. Id.
61. Id. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892.
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prospectively to hold that upon the dissolution of marriage, unless both
parties agree otherwise, the trial court must divide community property
retirement benefits on a 'pay as it comes' basis." ' 62 This doctrine remained
the law of New Mexico until 1993 when Ruggles was decided.
The Schweitzer court was troubled by the fact that under the "lump
sum" method the working spouse bore the entire risk that the pension
would never be realized or received. 63 If the working spouse should die
prematurely or for some other reason be unable to obtain the vested
and matured pension benefits, as might occur if the plan itself went
bankrupt, he or she would not receive an equal portion of the pension
asset under Copeland.64 The Schweitzer court stated that "the inequality
would be compounded if the employee spouse died first, having received
only a portion of his or her divided share but having paid the ex-spouse
the present value of all of his or her estimated lifetime share under the
lump sum decree." ' 65 The court had also grown weary of the ambiguities
inherent in the "lump sum" method and the resulting litigation. 66 These
ambiguities typically included choosing an appropriate interest rate to
discount the future stream of cash flows, and estimating the life span
67
of the working spouse.
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE RUGGLES COURT
Ruggles reversed Schweitzer, returning New Mexico to the "lump sum"
method of distribution for pension assets upon divorce. The Ruggles
decision affirmed the underlying philosophy of community property as
expressed in Copeland: "[Tihe fundamental principle that property attributable to community earnings must be divided equally when the
community is dissolved. ' 68 Another tenet of New Mexico's community
property law, as expressed in Hertz v. Hertz, is "the desirability of
granting each spouse complete and immediate control over his or her
share of the community property in order to ease the transition of the
parties after dissolution." 69 The Ruggles court sought to provide both
spouses with control of their prospective shares of the working spouse's
pension plan.70
The Ruggles court rejected the rationale of Schweitzer, stating that
while the working spouse may bear the risk of early death and the
resulting pension forfeiture under the lump sum method, the non-working
spouse is in greater need of immediate liquid assets, because he or she

62. Id. at 615, 711 P.2d 892.
63. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
64. Schweitzer, 103 N.M. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892.
65. Id.
66. See id.;
see also infra note 79.
67. Id.
68. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 58, 860 P.2d at 188 (quoting Copeland, 91 N.M. at 411, 575 P.2d
at 101).
69. Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 330, 657 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1983) (quoting Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 96 N.M. 529, 531, 632 P.2d 1167, 1169).
70. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 52, 860 P.2d at 182.
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may not have a job. 7' In addressing Schweitzer, the Ruggles court noted
that it is impossible to develop a system where both parties in a divorce
share the risk associated with community pension plans:
[W]e think it impossible to devise a system that, in all cases, will
result in both spouses bearing the risk of forfeiture equally. Although
as it
this is the professed goal of the reserved jurisdiction or "pay
72
comes in" method, its achievement of that goal is illusory.
The Ruggles court found that the "pay as it comes" method did not
foster a better sharing of the risk, because "the court has the prospect
of relitigating the parties' precise shares of the pension payments when73
risk."
the employee decides to retire. This is not an equal sharing of the
The Ruggles court also addressed the problem of the complex equations
that are necessary to discount a future stream of cash flows to a net
present value to determine a lump sum and found that such equations
74
are not too complicated to be workable. Although the Ruggles court
admitted that pension plans are "different from other assets whose current
values may be more easily fixed, ' 75 the court concluded that such contingencies can be accounted for using accepted actuarial and statistical
techniques.76 The court also pointed out that the "pay as it comes"
method is fraught with its own ambiguities, including the difficulty in
calculating the precise value added to the pension during coverture when
determining the share of the pension payments owed to the non-working
77

spouse.

In Ruggles, the court found that the lack of control over one's community share after divorce is a particularly odious aspect of the "pay
as it comes" method, because it contravenes the notion of an equal and
fair division of the community assets. 78 Echoing the rationale from the
Gillmore decision in California, the Ruggles court stated "[e]ven when
the husband has not yet retired, he has the ability to frustrate his wife's

71. Id. at 64, 860 P.2d at 194.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.at 65, 860 P.2d at 195. Insurance actuarial tables are fairly uniform and can be used
to accurately estimate the average life span of a person given certain identifiable risk factors.
However, in the net present value equation, the one variable which must be set arbitrarily is the
discount rate. This can have a significant impact on the value of the pension plan to the nonworking spouse. In the case of Nancy Ruggles, her husband's future stream of cash flows from
the Sandia pension was estimated to be $1570.71 per month. The marital settlement agreement
stipulated that Nancy should receive 4807o of that, or $753.94 per month. Assuming that Joseph
would live 20 years beyond his earliest retirement date, the following calculations illustrate the
difference in Nancy's lump sum payment given a 5%/0and a 10% discount rate:
NPV OF AN ORDINARY ANNUITY AT 5% = $114,240.99
NPV OF AN ORDINARY ANNUITY AT 10%= $78,126.75
For a complete discussion of net present value equations see Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 74101 (2d ed. 1990).
77. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 65, 860 P.2d 195.
78. Id.
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receipt of her as yet unpaid portion of the retirement benefits." 7 9 The
New Mexico court borrowed another argument from Gillmore, stating
that the immediacy with which a person receives a particular asset is a
factor of the asset's value.8 0
At trial, an expert witness summarized the problem when he observed
that under the "pay as it comes" method, every day Joseph Ruggles
remained on the job after his earliest retirement date decreased the value
of his wife's community share in the pension plan.8" Accordingly, the
court sought to give Nancy Ruggles control over her community assets,
even though a full lump sum distribution was not practical in that case.1 2
In awarding Nancy Ruggles a pro-rated share of payments equal to her
share of the pension, the court may have created a compromise between
"lump sum" and "pay as it comes," but the holding reiterated the
court's preference for full "lump sum" distribution in cases where there
are sufficient community assets.8 3
V. ANALYSIS
The doctrine of community property as it applies to timing and distribution of pension plans creates a dilemma between awarding both
spouses equal risk or equal control over the pension assets of the community. The two goals are mutually exclusive. The desire to spread the
risk is expressed in Schweitzer, which prevented one spouse from bearing
all the risk that pension assets would never actually be received; whereas
the desire to share control is expressed in Ruggles, which prevents one
spouse from having sole control over the timing of pension asset dis-

tribution .84

The logic of Schweitzer remains sound, despite an eloquent criticism
in Ruggles. Nevertheless, the Schweitzer holding is a cold-hearted syllogism
made without regard to the end result, which often creates hardship for
the non-working spouse. While it is true that under the "lump sum"
method the working spouse bears the risk of early death and therefore
forfeiture of the pension, the fact that the working spouse has died
prevents him or her from suffering any hardship over the loss of the
pension. A more valid criticism of the "lump sum" method, which was
not addressed in either Schweitzer or Ruggles, is that under a "lump
sum" method of distribution, the court is transforming the unrealized
pension (an asset which frequently is not devisable) into liquid assets

79. Id. at 66, 860 P.2d at 196.
80. Id. (citing Gillmore v. Gillmore, 629 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1981)).
81. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 56, 860 P.2d 186. A malicious ex-spouse could prevent his wife or her
husband from receiving any of the benefits from the pension plan by remaining on the job until
death. Many plans do offer a survivor benefit, but the employee usually has the power to designate
a beneficiary or an option to not have a survivor benefit. See OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 7.10 (1987).

82. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 62, 860 P.2d at 192.
83. Id. at 66, 860 P.2d at 196.
84. Schweitzer v. Burch, 103 N.M. 612, 615, 711 P.2d 889, 892 (1985).
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which the non-working spouse can transfer to someone else upon his or
her death. The non-working spouse can also transfer his or her share
of the entire pension asset inter vivos. The working spouse must wait
for the payments to arrive and is left with assets which terminate on
death or decrease in value when a survivor benefit option is chosen.8 5
Despite this consideration, the Ruggles court chose the more compassionate method of distribution in awarding the non-working spouse control
over his or her community assets. The court apparently found the effects
of Schweitzer to be too harsh on non-working spouses who could be
left penniless and jobless after a divorce, especially if the community's
assets were based primarily in the working spouse's pension plan. In
theory, if the interest rate is properly determined, the "lump sum method"
should be fair to both spouses as the working spouse is compensated
for the loss of immediate liquid assets by the larger, undiscounted pension
benefits received when he or she retires.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

It is unclear how trial courts are to implement the Ruggles decision,
because the Ruggles court expresses a preference for one method of
distribution, enforces another and allows the trial courts flexibility to
choose among several others.16 On an abstract level, the court embraces
the "lump sum" method as the method of choice, 7 but the remand
instructions in Ruggles suggest that the assets should be paid in installments
as if Joseph had retired when he was eligible to retire. 8 This is not an
application of the "lump sum" method, but it obviously remains an
acceptable method of distribution in New Mexico. This is especially true
if there are insufficient tangible assets in the community to make a "lump
sum" payment. Furthermore, the Ruggles court allows trial courts an
option to use the "pay as it comes" method, if that method is the only
practical one under the circumstances.8 9 By reinstating the trial court
decision, 9° the Ruggles court is expressing confidence in the ability of
the trial courts to make the proper decisions given the new flexibility of
the Ruggles holding. The "lump sum" method is now preferred in New
Mexico, but trial courts have wide latitude in dividing assets if a lump
sum distribution is not practical.
Now that the "lump sum" method is once again the preference in
New Mexico, vagaries of calculating a present value for future pension

85. ERISA requires "qualified" pension plans to have a survivorship benefit option. "Qualified
plans" are those that meet Internal Revenue Service requirements for tax advantaged status. Such
status allows the employee to postpone paying taxes on the benefits until they are actually received.
However, choosing the survivor benefits option usually decreases the monthly pension payments,
because there is a significant chance that the payments will continue for a longer period of time.
See OLDHAM, supra note 81, § 7.10 (1987).
86. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 66, 860 P.2d at 196.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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benefits will probably remain the focus of litigation, and most parties
to such litigation will be forced to hire expert witnesses. In particular,
the proper discount rate to be used in the lump sum calculation will be
a source of dispute. Attorneys for the non-working spouse will argue
for a low discount rate, thus increasing the lump sum payment, 9 but
such a strategy may backfire if the lump sum exceeds the community's
liquid assets. The courts can then award a "lump sum" in installments,
as was the case in Ruggles, but this method involves yet another interest
rate calculation and largely nullifies the benefits of an immediate distribution of property. In such cases, the trial court may be forced to
revert to the "pay as it comes" method. The Ruggles court recognized
this possibility: "[i]f there are no other assets, or insufficient assets, or
unsuitable assets, with which to satisfy (or secure) a lump sum distribution,
the court may be forced to award the nonemployee spouse's share 'as
it comes in.' ' 92 Thus, divorce attorneys would be well advised to choose
their discount rates prudently.
One could infer from the Ruggles decision that the cases which followed
and expanded Copeland are once again valid law in New Mexico, but
the issue remains open to debate. In particular, it is unclear whether
courts will enforce the landmark decision in Ridgeway regarding the
valuation of profit sharing plans at their current net worth. 93 Furthermore,
it is unclear whether the Hertz v. Hertz decision 94 allowing distribution
of unvested and unmatured plans will be enforced since Ruggles concerned
only vested and matured assets. 95
VII.

CONCLUSION

Ruggles represents a return to the Copeland decision with most of the
problems inherent with the "old lump sum" method. In this sense, the
Ruggles decision amounts to little more than a choice between the lesser
of two evils. However, the Ruggles decision allows trial courts wide
latitude in distributing assets if a lump sum distribution is not practical.
The instructions to the Ruggles trial court on remand also suggest a third
alternative, which would allow the working spouse to pay the lump sum
in installments.
Attorneys who practiced in New Mexico during the post-Schweitzer era
are faced with a new set of vagaries and ambiguities. These variables
will become weapons in the hands of those who are skilled in mathematics
and the language of finance. Those practitioners will manipulate the

91. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
92. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 67, 860 P.2d at 197.
93. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
94. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
95. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 54, 860 P.2d at 184. In addition to keeping a watchful eye on the
New Mexico Supreme Court's treatment of Copeland and its progeny, a careful practitioner should
keep abreast of all changes in federal laws governing pension plans because the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that such federal laws can preclude states from applying their own law. Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 99 U.S. 802 (1979); see supra note 21.
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variables to their advantage, but for many attorneys and judges, Ruggles
will remain a troublesome enigma solely within the domain of the expert
witness.
NORM CAIRNS

